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I. RATIONALE 
Cyber attacks have become surprisingly sophisticated over 
the past fifteen years. While early infections mostly targeted 
individual machines, recent threats leverage the widespread 
network connectivity to develop complex and highly 
coordinated attacks involving several distributed nodes [1]. 
Attackers are currently targeting very diverse domains, e.g., 
e-commerce systems, corporate networks, datacenter 
facilities and industrial systems, to achieve a variety of 
objectives, which range from credentials compromise to 
sabotage of physical devices, by means of smarter and 
smarter worms and rootkits. Stuxnet is a recent worm that 
well emphasizes the strong technical advances achieved by 
the attackers’ community. It was discovered in July 2010 
and firstly affected Iranian nuclear plants [2]. Stuxnet 
compromises the regular behavior of the supervisory control 
and data acquisition (SCADA) system by reprogramming 
the code of programmable logic controllers (PLC). Once 
compromised, PLCs can progressively destroy a device 
(e.g., components of a centrifuge, such as the case of the 
Iranian plant) by sending malicious control signals. Stuxnet 
combines a relevant number of challenging features: it 
exploits zero-days vulnerabilities of the Windows OS to 
affect the nodes connected to the PLC; it propagates either 
locally (e.g., by means of USB sticks) or remotely (e.g., via 
shared folders or the print spooler vulnerability); it is able to 
modify its behavior during the progression of the attack, and 
communicates with a remote command and control server. 
More importantly, Stuxnet can remain undetected for many 
months [3] because it is able to fool the SCADA system by 
emulating regular monitoring signals.  
The novelty of a Stuxnet-like attack model is the 
impairment of the monitoring and control system, which 
plays a critical role to ensure proper operations of a variety 
of systems, including industrial processes/plants, smart grids 
[4], and data centers of a grid- or cloud-computing 
infrastructure. Attacking a SCADA system can definitively 
lead to severe consequences, both economical and societal. 
For example, what if an attacker overloads a power 
distribution system by breaking into a power grid? What if 
environmental sensors of a cloud facility are maliciously 
compromised? Stuxnet has shown that SCADA systems are 
vulnerable to cyber attacks, and that attackers may 
physically damage critical infrastructures in the near future. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to tell whether there is a real chance 
to fully secure a SCADA system: as for regular computer 
systems, the variety of monitoring and control hardware/ 
software components (e.g., sensors, actuators, OSs, PLCs 
management tools) is inherently vulnerable because of 
residual exploits, intentional misuse, or bad operator 
practices (such as plugging in an infected media or writing 
down a password).  
This work discusses the role of diversity as a mean 
towards secure monitoring and control. The intuition 
underlying the proposal is that diversity can be leveraged to 
raise the effort it takes to conduct a successful attack (in 
terms of attack resources and time) to such a level so as to 
make it pointless to attempt an attack at all. For example, 
let us consider an attack that requires compromising two 
machines in order to be successful. If the machines are 
identical, it suffices to compromise one machine and then 
repeating the exploit for the other, i.e., the chance of a 
successful attack PSA to the system is related to the chance 
of compromising just one machine (PSA≈PM). When the 
machines are different, PSA is smaller because it becomes 
somewhat related to chance of compromising each machine 
separately (i.e., PSA≈PM1×PM2): succeeding is harder and 
time-consuming. Diversity is not used here to replicate 
components. We claim that a monitoring and control 
system, when possible, can smartly combine diverse 
technologies to significantly increase the effort to conduct a 
successful attack. Key aspects, issues and future research 
directions are briefly discussed in the following. 
II. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF DIVERSITY 
Diversity is a valuable mean to achieve the mentioned 
objective; however, the complex nature and dynamics of 
Stuxnet-like attacks make it difficult to assess the actual 
impact of diversity from a cyber security perspective. We 
propose a three-step attack modeling and evaluation 
approach (i) to identify the components that can be 
potentially diversified in a given SCADA system, and (ii) to 
evaluate to what extent a given diversity degree can actually 
impact the effort it takes to fulfill an attack. The proposal 
drives a balanced approach between secure system design 
and diversification costs. Fig. 1 depicts the steps of the 
proposed modeling and evaluation approach. 
 
Figure 1.  Proposed modeling and evaluation approach. 
The goal of the proposal is to estimate how a set of 
security-oriented indicators varies when diverse HW/SW 
components are used in the system. Example of security 
indicators are: (i) Time-To-Attack, i.e., the time between the 
beginning and completion of an attack; (ii) Time-To-
Security-Failure [5], i.e., the time between the beginning of 
the attack and the perceived attack manifestation; (iii) 
compromised ratio, i.e., the number of compromised 
components at time t with respect to the total number of 
components. Key characteristics of each step are:  
 Attack Modeling. Progression of an attack, in terms of 
the stages the attack undergoes before success (e.g., 
initial, activated, root access, network propagation, device 
impairment) is formalized by means of a model. Potential 
modeling approaches include, for example, Bayesian 
networks, Petri-nets, or attack trees. For each stage, we 
identify the system HW/SW components (e.g., OS, 
firewall, programs, devices) that impact the probability of 
the attack to move to the next progression stage. For 
example, the chance to accomplish the sample root access 
stage may depend on the underlying OS version; similarly, 
the device compromise stage might be harder to fulfill if 
the device targeted by the attack is someway resilient to 
malicious control signals.  
 Design of Experiments (DoE) & Measurements. We 
assess security indicators when diverse components are 
introduced in the system. Impact of diversity is emulated 
by varying the success probabilities involved at each 
attack stage. For instance, the root access stage might 
have a success probability P1 when operating system OS1 
is used, or P2 in case OS2 is used (P1≠P2). Probability 
values reflect the availability of tools and/or exploits that 
can be leveraged to accomplish a given stage. Probability 
values are established either by means of previously 
documented attack history, or by emulating malware 
samples in a controlled environment (e.g., honeypots), or 
by performing a sensitivity analysis. Given the large 
number of HW/SW components that can be potentially 
diversified in a real system, the choices of probability 
values and related combinations, measurement of security 
indicators is driven by a DoE approach. DoE allows 
narrowing the number of configurations to assess. Security 
indicators are measured by running the attack model 
against each configuration identified by means of DoE. 
 Diversity Assessment. In this step it is assessed how the 
adoption of diverse components impacts security 
indicators. To this aim, we plan to use ANalysis Of 
VAriance (ANOVA) techniques, which make it possible 
to allocate the variability of the security indicators 
(measured across the different system configurations 
established in the previous step) to the component(s) 
responsible for such variability. This step allows 
identifying the system HW/SW components that impact 
security indicators, and thus valuable to diversify in the 
real system implementation.  
We are in the process of instantiating the proposed 
framework to assess the resilience against Stuxnet-like 
attacks of the cooling system of the SCoPE data center at 
the Federico II University of Naples (www.scope.unina.it). 
A system model encompassing control/monitoring nodes 
and PLCs has been developed by means of the stochastic 
activity networks (SAN) formalism. A preliminary 
sensitivity analysis indicates that the use of a small, 
strategically distributed, number of highly attack-resilient 
components can significantly lower the chance of bringing a 
successful attack to the system. 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We discussed the principles underlying a modeling and 
evaluation approach conceived to support a diversity-based 
design for more secure monitoring and control in a 
distributed system. We aim to improve the approach both 
from the attack- and system-perspective by introducing a 
wider set of threat models, such as Duqu and Flame, and by 
modeling the impact of a wider set of components, e.g., 
sensors, actuators, firewall.  The approach will be used to 
assess and improve attack-resiliency of real-world critical 
infrastructures.   
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